PURPOSE OF REPORT

To outline the key features of Greater Manchester’s feasibility study and its Outline Business Case to reduce nitrogen dioxide exceedances in the shortest possible time that has been developed collectively by all Greater Manchester local authorities and the GMCA, and co-ordinated by TfGM in line with Government direction and guidance; and commend the OBC to districts for adoption.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Members are recommended to:

i. note that the Greater Manchester authorities are working together to address nitrogen dioxide exceedances at the roadside and that it is predicted that there will be 250 points of exceedance across 152 road links and all ten local authority areas in 2021;

ii. note that Government requires Greater Manchester to undertake a feasibility study and as part of this study, to submit an Outline Business Case (OBC) by the end of March 2019;

iii. note that further stakeholder engagement and public consultation is an essential part of the process to help inform and refine ongoing work to produce a Final Business Case by the end of the calendar year;

iv. note that significant financial support from Government will be required to deliver the measures described in the OBC in a way that contributes to GMCA’s wider economic, social and environmental objectives; and

v. commend to all districts both the collaborative approach adopted to meet Greater Manchester’s NO₂ challenge and the key features of the OBC, as set out in this report, noting that the decision-making with regard to the OBC is for each constituent local authority to undertake.
vi. Reconfirm Greater Manchester’s clear expectation of Government that the following will be put in place in support of this plan:
   a. Clear arrangements and funding to develop workable, local vehicle scrappage / upgrade measures;
   b. Short term effective interventions in vehicle and technology manufacturing and distribution, led by national Government with local authorities;
   c. Replacement of non-compliant buses; and
   d. A clear instruction to Highways England with regard to air pollution from the strategic highway network in Greater Manchester.

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RISK / FINANCIAL / LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

Legal Considerations
See Sections 4 and 5

Risk Management and Financial Consequences: Revenue and Capital
The report describes a draft Outline Business Case. Following consideration by the GMCA, and the outcome of each constituent Council’s governance processes, further work will be undertaken to develop the Full Business Case which will identify and fully assess risk and financial implications, that are set out in the draft Outline Business Case.

BACKGROUND PAPERS:

- 11 January 2019, report to GMCA/AGMA: Clean Air Update
- 14 December 2018, report to GMCA: Clean Air Update
- 30 November 2018, report to GMCA: Clean Air Plan Update
- 26 October 2018, report to GMCA: GM Clean Air Plan Update on Local Air Quality Monitoring
- 15 November 2018, report to HPEOS Committee: Clean Air Update
- 16 August 2018, report to HPEOS Committee: GM Clean Air Plan Update
- UK plan for tackling roadside nitrogen dioxide concentrations, Defra and DfT, July 2017

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRACKING/PROCESS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Does this report relate to a major strategic decision, as set out in the GMCA Constitution (paragraph 14.2) or in the process (paragraph 13.1 AGMA Constitution) agreed by the AGMA Executive Board:</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
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<td>EXEMPTION FROM CALL IN</td>
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<td>Are there any aspects in this report which means it should be considered to be exempt from call in by the AGMA Scrutiny Pool on the grounds of urgency?</td>
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<td>AGMA Commission</td>
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1. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

1.1 The Combined Authority has been clear that taking action on air quality is not optional. The severe and long lasting health implications of poor air quality as well as the legal obligations placed on Greater Manchester local authorities means that authorities need to act decisively and swiftly to reduce harmful air pollutants, and nitrogen oxides in particular.

1.2 Greater Manchester authorities in deciding to work together to respond to this vital issue are demonstrating collective leadership, which is essential to help clean the air for our combined population of nearly three million residents. Greater Manchester authorities that have been formally directed by government have been joined by those (Rochdale and Wigan) that have not, as analysis reveals that locations of damaging roadside nitrogen dioxide concentrations can be found in every district.

1.3 Given that air pollution does not respect boundaries, this coordinated approach is also the most effective way to deal with a problem that affects all parts of Greater Manchester, and cannot be remedied on a site by site or district by district basis.

1.4 The ten authorities, supported by Transport for Greater Manchester, have now developed a draft package of co-ordinated and robust measures in a very short period of time that complies with the highly prescriptive Government guidance for tackling NOx emissions.

1.5 However, much more work is required to flesh out some of the measures to ensure that they achieve their intended purpose, and to ensure that the measures proposed to support affected businesses and individuals are fair and effective and that the socio-economic impacts of measures are understood and can be mitigated. This is why further engagement with stakeholders and affected parties to refine the measures, in addition to full public consultation, are vital next steps in the process toward developing the Full Business Case by the end of the year.

1.6 The Greater Manchester approach, set out below, will require significant government funding. Without full financial support, the package of measures described below which was devised in the context of guidance that identified Implementation Funding and Clean Air Plan funding is unlikely to deliver the intended results. In a scenario of inadequate government support, the most obvious outcomes are a failure to reduce exceedances as quickly as required, and economic damage, for example to local businesses who are left unsupported but required to upgrade their vehicle fleet.

1.7 By taking a combined approach, Greater Manchester’s bid for the substantial funding required to deal with this key public health priority can only be strengthened.
2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 GMCA and the GM Housing, Planning and Environment Scrutiny Committee have taken a series of reports over the past year that have set out the health challenge presented by poor air quality, the legal context and the tightly specified approach that Government has directed local authorities to follow within very tight timescales in order to address predicted nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) exceedances in the shortest possible time.

2.2 These are summarised below, followed by a description of the feasibility study and the resulting OBC that has been developed by the GM Steering Group, following government guidance.

3. AIR QUALITY AND HEALTH

3.1 Poor air quality is the largest environmental risk to the public’s health. Taking action to improve air quality is crucial to improve population health.

3.2 Whilst air quality has been generally improving over time, particular pollutants remain a serious concern in many urban areas. These are oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and its harmful form nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), and particulate matter (PM).

3.3 In Greater Manchester road transport is responsible for approximately 80% of NO₂ concentrations at roadside, of which diesel vehicles are the largest source.

3.4 Long-term exposure to elevated levels of particulate matter (PM2.5, PM10) and NO₂ may contribute to the development of cardiovascular or respiratory disease, and may reduce life expectancy. The youngest, the oldest, those living in areas of deprivation, and those with existing respiratory or cardiovascular disease are most likely to develop symptoms due to exposure to air pollution.

3.5 Public Health England estimate the health and social care costs across England due to exposure to air pollution will be £5.3 billion by 2035 for diseases where there is a strong association with air pollution, or £18.6 billion for all diseases with evidence of an association with air pollution.

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3 RCP and RCPCH London, Every breath we take lifelong impact of air pollution (2016), https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/every-breath-we-take-lifelong-impact-air-pollution
4. LEGAL BACKGROUND

4.1 Because of their harm to human health, legal Limit Values\(^5\) for concentrations of certain pollutants in ambient air have been established. The European Ambient Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) incorporates many of the World Health Organisation (WHO)\(^1\) air quality standards into European Law, which was transposed into English law by the 2010 Air Quality Standards Regulations (SI. 2010 No. 1001).

4.2 The 2010 regulations set legally binding limits for concentrations of major air pollutants that affect human health, including NO\(_2\) and particulates. Regulation 26 of the 2010 Regulations requires the Secretary of State to draw up and implement a national air quality plan so as to achieve the relevant limit or target value within the “shortest possible time”.

4.3 Since 2010, the UK has been in breach of legal Limit Values for NO\(_2\) concentrations in major urban areas.

4.4 The Greater Manchester Urban Area Zone is one of 37 reporting zones across the UK where the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) modelling of annual mean NO\(_2\) concentrations predicts levels that exceed statutory Limit Values.

4.5 Whilst Greater Manchester currently meets Limit Values for other pollutants, the 2016 Greater Manchester Low Emission Strategy and Air Quality Action Plan set out a co-ordinated approach for reducing all air pollutants, including particulates, as well as carbon dioxide.

5. GOVERNMENT’S UK AIR QUALITY PLANS

5.1 Since 2010, Government has produced three successive Air Quality Plans to reduce NO\(_2\) emissions in line with Limit Values. Environmental campaigning law organisation ClientEarth successfully challenged these Air Quality Plans in the High and Supreme Courts for failing to include actions necessary to achieve NO\(_2\) Limit Values “in the shortest possible time”\(^6\).

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\(^5\) European Union Limit Value regarding levels of NO\(_2\) in major urban areas (40 micrograms per cubic metre (µg/m\(^3\))) set by the European Ambient Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) as implemented into UK law by the 2010 Air Quality Standards Regulations (SI. 2010 No. 1001)

\(^6\) \(R\) (on the application of ClientEarth) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28.
5.2 Each successful legal challenge increased the number of local authorities directed by Government to take action. Over 60 local authorities are now under Direction:

- 2015: Birmingham Derby, Leeds, Nottingham and Southampton.
- 2018: 33 further local authorities, including Oldham.

5.3 In July 2017 Government served a Direction on seven Greater Manchester local authorities requiring them to produce a feasibility study, in accordance with the HM Treasury’s Green Book, in which they must identify the option which will deliver compliance with legal limits for nitrogen dioxide in the area for which the authority is responsible in the “shortest possible time”.

5.4 This Direction was supplemented by guidance issued by the Department for Transport (DfT), including the ‘Clean Air Zone Framework’ and the ‘UK plan for tackling roadside nitrogen dioxide concentrations’.

5.5 Government also established the Joint Air Quality Unit (JAQU) to help deliver the National Plan by closely guiding local authorities.

5.6 Government has allocated £255 million for Implementation Funding and £220 million for a Clean Air Fund. Local authorities will be allocated Implementation Funding based on their Final Business Case. Local authorities will bid to the Clean Air Fund for support to help local people, businesses and other groups to switch to cleaner vehicles or make alternative travel choices.

5.7 The proposals put forward will therefore be conditional upon sufficient funding being provided by Government.

5.8 Oldham Council are under a separate Direction which they complied with by the production of their feasibility study submitted to JAQU in July 2018. No further Direction was issued to Oldham as Government acknowledged in its supplemental plan that the exceedance identified in Oldham was being considered as part of the Greater Manchester plan.

5.9 Whilst Rochdale and Wigan Councils were not compelled to act through a ministerial Direction, they are participating in the Greater Manchester-wide approach as they are required to address the exceedances that have been identified within their boundaries during the Target Determination exercise (see further detail in Section 7). This revealed 250 points of exceedance across 152 road links and all ten districts in 2021.

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7 Environment Act 1995 (Feasibility Study for Nitrogen Dioxide Compliance) Air Quality Direction 2017
10 Environment Act 1995 (Feasibility Study for Nitrogen Dioxide Compliance) Air Quality Direction 2018
On this basis, Greater Manchester’s collective approach to develop a city-region wide Clean Air Plan has been accepted by government, and consequently no further ministerial Directions have been issued. A letter from the Minister in January 2019 requires GM’s OBC to be submitted by end of March 2019.

Government officials have subsequently confirmed the following “we are content with the baseline modelling. In line with our guidance, as your local model has identified NO₂ exceedances on roads within the PCM network beyond those modelled nationally, these should be addressed in your air quality plan. This means your plan should address the exceedances identified in all 10 authorities, in line with the approach you are already taking. Following submission of your Outline Business Case by 31 March we anticipate, subject to a review of the plan you submit, that Ministers will direct local authorities to proceed to continue to develop an FBC and to start implementing plans, together with appropriate funding. It is likely this stage this would entail directing all 10 Greater Manchester authorities.”

If a local authority chose to not approve the OBC for submission to the government’s Joint Air Quality Unit, this could, without an alternative plan to reduce NO₂ emissions in the shortest possible time, lead to a potential legal challenge against the said local authority.

The government Directives referred to above relate only to the roads that local authorities are responsible for, and does not direct local authorities to assess or act to reduce NO₂ concentrations on the Strategic Road Network (SRN, typically motorways) managed by Highways England (a government owned company).

This is a significant issue in the context of the 120 km of SRN that stretches across the conurbation, often through urban areas. Motorway traffic, where the carriageway runs close to a local road can contribute up to 50% more pollution than local roads. Between 30 - 40% of east-west HGV traffic does not exit the SRN in Greater Manchester, but travels through it.

In addition there are locations where high levels of pollution measured close to residential properties are the result of the flows of tens of thousands of vehicles per day, including approximately 13,000 HGV’s, on the SRN and not as a result of traffic on the local highway network.

Greater Manchester is working with Highways England to ensure that they play a much more active role in developing measures which will effectively complement those set out below, and these will need to be clearly identified in the Full Business Case.

GREATER MANCHESTER FEASIBILITY STUDY

A Greater Manchester Senior Leadership Steering Group (Steering Group) is responsible for guiding the feasibility study. Members include Directors or Assistant Directors from each local authority and senior representatives from Highways
England, Public Health England, AGMA, Local Partnerships and Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) and JAQU.

6.2 The purpose of taking a Greater Manchester-wide approach is to avoid introducing measures in one part of the conurbation that simply displace pollution to other locations, and to ensure that (as far as possible) the eventual agreed package of measures complements other Greater Manchester strategies.

6.3 TfGM has been coordinating the GM feasibility study on behalf of the ten Greater Manchester local authorities, who remain legally responsible for reducing NO\textsubscript{2} to legal Limit Values.

6.4 The feasibility study process comprises a series of steps and processes, namely: Strategic Outline Case, Initial Evidence and Target Determination, Outline Business Case and Full Business Case. These are outlined below.

7. INITIAL EVIDENCE AND TARGET DETERMINATION

7.1 In their National Plan, Government identified eleven areas of road, within seven Greater Manchester local authorities, where the national Pollution Climate Mapping (PCM) model predicted NO\textsubscript{2} concentrations are likely to exceed the statutory NO\textsubscript{2} annual mean EU Limit Value beyond 2020. Oldham was added in a later supplement to the National Plan (March 2018).

7.2 The predictions in the national model were based on national scale assumptions and datasets, and were required to be verified against local evidence.

7.3 More informed local analysis revealed a bigger problem than that identified by Government. It predicts a greater spatial distribution of NO\textsubscript{2} exceedances across roads in all Greater Manchester districts and typically higher concentrations of NO\textsubscript{2} in specific locations.

7.4 Local modelling identified 152 stretches of road (road links) where concentrations of NO\textsubscript{2} are forecast to exceed the legal Limit Value (40 µg/m\textsuperscript{3}) beyond 2020. 112 of these road links are on the national PCM model, which have the highest car use and heavy freight flows. 40 of these are shorter stretches of local roads, often around town centres across Greater Manchester where there is greater bus, taxi and van usage.

7.5 Local modelling also predicts higher concentrations of NO\textsubscript{2} in locations across Greater Manchester. This means the concentration of NO\textsubscript{2} in the air at roadside is worse than originally predicted by Government.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} Modelling of air quality can be presented in two different ways: a point along a road which has a certain concentration of NO\textsubscript{2} or the stretch of road which has a certain concentration of NO\textsubscript{2}. 

GMCA 20190301 Greater Manchester's Clean Air Plan – Tackling Nitrogen Dioxide Exceedances at the Roadside - Outline Business Case v1.0

25/02/2019 17:52
Some of the reasons for this are that vehicles using Greater Manchester’s roads are typically older than the national average (especially buses and taxis); that local traffic data showed that in some areas vehicles are moving more slowly than the national modelling anticipated; and because local modelling also showed higher background concentrations of NO₂ than the national modelling.

The outcome of the local modelling is an agreement, referred to as Target Determination, of the NO₂ exceedances that Greater Manchester must resolve when developing possible solutions. The Greater Manchester modelling has now been agreed by Government, meaning that all the illegal exceedances in all ten GM local authority areas need to be addressed.

8. STRATEGIC OUTLINE CASE

8.1 The Strategic Outline Case (SOC) was submitted to Government in March 2018. This document identified a long-list of 96 measures, which was then sifted to a shortlist of 14, based on Government’s Primary Success Criteria (defined as reduction of NO₂ concentrations in the “shortest possible time”).

8.2 The SOC recognised that as locations of exceedances identified by Government covered areas across Greater Manchester, no single measure was likely to deliver legal compliance on its own.

8.3 Table 1. Shortlisted Measures in the Strategic Outline Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortlisted measure</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrofit/upgrade public transport fleet</td>
<td>Retrofit or upgrade vehicles to a higher Euro standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrofit/upgrade local authority fleets</td>
<td>Retrofit or upgrade to a higher Euro standard (procurement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase public transport capacity</td>
<td>Identify specific routes where most impact will be made, with a particular focus on the role that an attractive bus system would need to play in achieving significant additional modal shift in the near term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch Bus/HGV/LGV/GM fleet to GtL</td>
<td>Using cleaner alternative fuels, e.g. Gas-to-Liquid (GtL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric vehicle (EV) incentivisation</td>
<td>Increase EV uptake through expanding the charging network or financial incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential parking charges</td>
<td>E.g. different charges for times of day, vehicle type, car sharers and could include a workplace parking levy.</td>
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Presenting point data provides more specific and detailed information on the air quality problem, as it allows an understanding of how concentrations of NO₂ vary at different locations on the road. The OBC modelling presents emissions information on the basis of point data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortlisted measure</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congestion Deal – increase capacity</td>
<td>Review existing junction improvement plans – assess impact and identify opportunities to accelerate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congestion Deal – encouraging alternatives</td>
<td>Encouraging alternative travel choices through road space reallocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congestion Deal – network management</td>
<td>Changing traffic signal timing to optimise flows, reducing congestion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private hire and taxi alternative fuels</td>
<td>Incentivise change to EV/Ultra-Low-Emission vehicles, increase EV infrastructure for taxis, retrofitting and increasing LPG refuelling infrastructure for taxis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications campaigns</td>
<td>Increase awareness of health and cost benefits for public and of different modes of transport or around particular communities/schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable travel engagement</td>
<td>Work with employers and individuals to encourage sustainable travel choices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active travel programme – infrastructure</td>
<td>Expand and improve cycling and walking infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air Zones – Class B, C or D</td>
<td>Different classifications/time restriction and geographical areas to be modelled for their impact on NO₂ and timescale of any impact.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4 Government guidance sets out charging Clean Air Zones (CAZ) as the measure most likely to achieve legal Limit Values for NO₂ in the shortest possible time. A charging CAZ places a penalty on the most polluting vehicles moving within a designated area. Government guidance specifies that local authorities must consider charging CAZ as their benchmark measure.

8.5 Government specifies four classes of charging CAZ that apply penalties to different types of vehicle that are classified as non-compliant because they fall below particular European Commission emission standards. Cleaner, compliant vehicles are not charged.

- Class A: Buses, coaches, taxis and private hire vehicles.
- Class B: Buses, coaches, heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) taxis and private hire vehicles.
- Class C: Buses, coaches, HGVs, large vans, minibuses, small vans/ light commercials, taxis and private hire vehicles.
- Class D: Buses, coaches, HGVs, large vans, minibuses, small vans/ light commercials, taxis and private hire, cars, motorcycles/mopeds.
8.6 The associated emissions standards are as follows:

- Euro 3 for motorcycles, mopeds, motorised tricycles and quadricycles.
- Euro 4 for petrol cars, vans, minibuses and other specialist vehicles.
- Euro 6 for diesel cars, vans and minibuses and other specialist vehicles.
- Euro VI for lorries, buses and coaches and other specialist heavy vehicles.

8.7 It is important to recognise the clear differences between Clean Air Zones and Congestion Charging systems, not least in terms of their very different objectives and time-spans. The objective of any penalty in a CAZ is for all vehicles which drive within the area in a Clean Air Zone to have engines which comply with emissions standards. Unlike Congestion Charging, a CAZ does not seek to reduce the number of vehicles on roads. This means that over time and as vehicles are upgraded, the number of penalties levied reduces. CAZs are therefore relatively short-term, only apply to non-compliant vehicles and will operate at a loss once vehicles become cleaner. Under a Congestion Charge however, the requirement to pay applies to all vehicles, is enduring, and creates a long-term revenue stream. In contrast a CAZ in its later years should not generate surpluses as vehicles become cleaner.

8.8 GMCA has ruled out congestion charging.

9. **ASSESSING THE OPTIONS FOR GREATER MANCHESTER**

9.1 Following the issue of the SOC in March 2018, a process of refining the shortlisted measures and developing a range of options that combine the measures in different ways has been undertaken. This was overseen by the GM Steering Group, to understand the type and scale of intervention needed to reduce NO₂ to within legal Limit Values in the “shortest possible time” across Greater Manchester.

9.2 A best performing option is recommended within the OBC for further consideration and discussion with stakeholders and the public to aid the development of the Full Business Case.

9.3 The core goal of the GM Clean Air Plan is to address the legal requirement to remove ALL exceedances of concentrations of NO₂ that have been forecasted to exceed the legal Limit Value (40 µg/m³) identified through the target determination process in the “shortest possible time” in line with with Government guidance and legal rulings.
9.4 Options have been assessed against the UK Government’s Primary Critical Success Factors:

- **Reduction in NO₂ emissions**: likelihood that the measure/option will contribute significantly to a reduction in NO₂ concentrations to achieve compliance with the EU Limit Values
- **Feasibility**: likelihood of measure being implemented in time to deliver desired NO₂ reduction and achieve compliance.

9.5 Where modelled options deliver compliance in the same year they have been further assessed against Government’s Secondary Critical Success Factors, as set out in the SOC:

- **Strategic fit with local strategies and plans**: ensuring the alignment of the option with longer term economic, social and environmental goals and that the risk of unintended consequences is minimised.
- **Value for money**: a high-level indication of the costs and benefits of each option.
- **Distributional impact**: in order to understand the potential impacts, both positive and negative on different groups within society, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable. It is of vital importance that the plan does not result in disproportionately negative economic or social impacts for the region or those living, working or doing business within it.
- **Deliverability** of the options, in terms of the affordability of the cost of implementation, the supply-side capacity and capability to deliver the measures outlined in the options, and the achievability of delivering the option.

9.6 The SOC identified that the fundamental causes of the exceedances were variable in terms of the source of emissions and that these sites were interconnected in complex ways. Therefore, any effective proposals would need to comprise of a package of measures, able to tackle the overall problem holistically.

9.7 A series of six options comprising of different packages of measures was developed initially in response to the problem as revealed by local modelling. These measures have been assessed and refined further from the shortlist in Table 1.

9.8 The assessment process involved further modelling and analysis of the effectiveness of measures, both individually and as a package; this included engagement with stakeholders and professional experts, and the use of a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) tool to assess the performance of each option against the success factors and relative to each other. In this way, the measures and packages of options have been assessed and refined into a preferred option that best secures the required objectives.
9.9 Figure 1. Summary of six options for initial appraisal

9.10 Following the initial appraisal of the six options, three were discounted (see section 9) and three developed as the ‘best performing’ options to be subject to a more detailed appraisal process.

9.11 These three options were derived from options 4 and 5 above and have been adapted to reflect a deeper level of understanding of the issues that emerged throughout the options appraisal process. As such, they are considered more likely to deliver effective reductions in NOx emissions and greater compliance than the options initially specified.

9.12 In particular, the following changes have been made:

- Various incentives measures were judged to be ineffective for the specific requirements set by Government for a NOx plan (e.g.: public transport improvements beyond the existing programme and GTL conversion for HGVs) or undeliverable in the timescale/ with existing powers and have been excluded.

- Vehicle Renewal Schemes to help businesses and residents upgrade their vehicle have been included.

- The initial assessment suggested that the second-hand van market would not be sufficiently mature by 2021 to support a large-scale CAZ for vans – a lack of available, affordable and compliant vehicles could result in a higher than predicted proportion of vehicles ‘staying and paying’ rather than upgrading and create substantial risk of economic damage. Therefore, implementation of the city region scheme has been divided into two phases: Phase 1 would involve a CAZ B encompassing buses, hackney cabs and PHVs, HGVs and coaches; and Phase 2 would extend to a CAZ C including vans and minibuses at a later date.
• Finally, and related to the point above, the M60 boundary in Option 5 has been dropped, with the schemes only reviewed for possible application within the Inner Relief Route or at GM-wide instead. Applying an additional boundary adds cost and complexity to the scheme, and risks customer confusion. Further analysis showed that the M60 boundary does not reflect where the outstanding locations of non-compliance remain post-2021, many of which are outside this zone. Therefore, it does not make sense in terms of delivering compliance in the shortest possible time to implement a second phase solely in this zone.

• Two variants of option 5 were explored, one including a CAZ D within the IRR (Option 5(i)) and one where the CAZ D was enhanced so that all diesel cars and PHVs were considered non-compliant (Option 5(ii)).

9.13 Figure 2 – Summary of three best performing options for detailed appraisal

9.14 Discussions with the local authorities raised two significant concerns: that the risk of unintended socio-economic consequences is not sufficiently understood; and that other options had not been explored in sufficient depth to be ruled out.

9.15 As a result, further work was undertaken to address these concerns. This involved additional analysis of the socio-economic impacts, and assessment of two new options, following the same process as utilised to date.
9.16 **Figure 3 – Further options assessed**

![Diagram showing options 7 and 8 with phase one and phase two phases]

**Option 7**
- A GM-wide penalty for buses, taxis (hackney cabs/PHVs) and HGVs

**Option 8**
- A GM-wide penalty for buses, taxis and commercial vehicles in phase one, expanding to LGVs in phase 2

9.17 Modelling has indicated that:

- Option 4 is predicted to deliver compliance (so that all sites have concentrations below the Limit Value) by 2025,

- Options; 5(i), 5(ii) and 8 are all predicted to deliver compliance one year earlier, in 2024.

- Option 7 was not likely to be sufficient, delivering lower emissions benefits in each year, than Option 8 and reaching compliance two years later, in 2026

9.18 Options 4 and 7 were therefore ruled out of further consideration, because options 5(i), 5(ii) and 8 deliver compliance earliest.

9.19 Further information on how each option performs in terms of the compliance date is set out in Annex 1.
9.20 **Figure 4 – Assessment of compliance of options**

9.21 Options 5(i), 5(ii) and 8, as the most promising options, have been considered in terms of their performance against the Primary and Secondary Success Factors. A table summarising this assessment are included in Annex 2.

10. **WHY OPTIONS 2, 3 AND 6 WERE DISCOUNTED**

10.1 Options 2, 3 and 6 were ruled out as they did not deliver compliance in the shortest possible time:

10.2 Option 2 – Parking measures have a limited effect on the heaviest and dirtiest vehicles, such as HGVs and buses. They only affect those cars or vans that need to park in an area and not those passing through, or those with uncontrolled or off-street parking available. A Workplace Parking Levy has been shown to be effective in deterring car travel and supporting investment in more sustainable modes in the only UK example (in Nottingham), but the implementation timeframe is slow and the measure is poorly targeted in terms of its effect on the dirtiest vehicles. There are very few controlled parking zones or residents’ parking permit schemes in place across the city-region and thus it would be difficult and expensive to deliver differential parking on-street. Off street public parking is managed through contracts owned by the ten districts, running to different timescales and with limited flexibility in the short term. In summary, using parking as the constraint measure was deemed challenging to implement, poorly targeted and not likely to deliver compliance in the shortest possible time.

10.3 Option 3 – A city centre penalty for high polluting vehicles would have effect in the city centre and on the key radial routes into to the city centre. However, air quality modelling has shown that a city centre CAZ D, with no further CAZ measures across the remainder of GM, would leave around 200 sites non-compliant within the wider region in 2021, including some sites of non-compliance within the city centre itself.
It has therefore been demonstrated that the option does not deliver compliance in the shortest possible time and has been rejected.

10.4 Option 6 – A GM-wide CAZ D was developed to understand whether compliance could be achieved under any scenario by 2021. The ‘all or nothing’ nature of this proposal presented a risk that no real improvements to air quality would be achieved for quite some time, and the time to compliance would be highly uncertain.

10.5 Specifically, with regard to option 6;

- The assessment assumed that all of the options can be delivered by 2021. It is very unlikely that all aspects of the scheme, from the technical work required to design the scheme, to the scale of the infrastructure provision and customer service offer required to deliver it, could be delivered in that timescale.
- The scale of the intervention across the whole of GM is considered to be potentially undeliverable in physical terms.
- The modelling also forecasts substantial mode shift from car to public transport, but for many of the diverse trips across the wider city-region there is simply not a viable public transport alternative available (at this time) and this mode shift is not likely to materialise and it would not be possible in the required timescales to deliver transformative public transport improvements to facilitate this mode shift. This would therefore significantly delay compliance.
- A scheme on this scale would raise very significant issues in terms of the economic and social impact on the region, and widespread mitigation measures would be required that are not likely to be feasible.

10.6 In summary, Option 6 would not deliver compliance in the shortest possible time, and would not perform effectively in terms of reducing human exposure due to long periods where non-compliant vehicles continue to be used.

11. DETERMINING THE PREFERRED OPTION

11.1 Options 5(i), 5(ii) and 8, include a package of Measures, designed to ensure local people and businesses are fully informed about clean air and know how they can reduce their contribution to poor air quality; to encourage the uptake of the cleanest vehicles; and most significantly, to support local businesses to upgrade their fleets as quickly as possible.

11.2 In addition, all three options propose a region-wide CAZ, starting at Category B from 2021 and expanding to a Category C in a later phase, assumed to be 2023. This large scale scheme is challenging to implement, in terms of: the need for substantial funding and support from Government; as well as the need for considerable collaboration between the ten districts; and the demand generated for compliant vehicles from a range of suppliers. Nevertheless, it is clear from the analysis carried out to date that a smaller scale scheme would not be sufficient to deliver compliance in the shortest possible time.
The full implementation of a CAZ C is proposed for 2023 rather than 2021 due to the assessment which suggested that the second-hand compliant van market would not be sufficiently mature by 2021 to provide compliant upgrade options and support the implementation of large-scale CAZ for vans. Crucially, this does not delay the year of achieving compliance and reduces the risk of socio-economic damage. Modelling indicates that a GM-wide CAZ C cannot deliver compliance in 2021 or earlier than 2024 regardless of when it is implemented.

It is however vital to support local businesses, residents and operators to upgrade their vehicles, not least as Greater Manchester has an older than average fleet and an economy dominated by small businesses. There is a risk that without these supporting Measures, the CAZ will be ineffective because businesses cannot afford to upgrade or the effect of the scheme will cause unacceptable economic damage.

Furthermore, there is a risk that a CAZ implemented without financial support could damage the public and accessible transport offer in the region. At present, most buses and nearly all hackney cabs and many private hire vehicles in the region are non-compliant, with the oldest vehicles typically owned by small local businesses or sole traders. There is a risk that without support, bus operators may choose to reduce bus services rather than upgrade their fleets, that hackney cab drivers switch to driving compliant but less accessible private hire vehicles, and that the private hire trade is potentially impacted by the financial cost of upgrading a non-compliant vehicles.

Therefore, the Clean Vehicle Funds to be demanded of Government, are an essential and common component to achieve compliance. They add to the cost and complexity of delivery, and there is concern over the ability to supply sufficient compliant vehicles to meet demand.

Options 5(i) and 5(ii) would require further and additional financial support to help private car drivers upgrade their vehicle. Such an approach could be considered high risk, as a viable and value-for-money private car scrappage-type model has not been identified that would satisfy HM Treasury, and none have been developed and tested in the UK to date. Further, the analysis indicates that a city centre penalty for private cars, a feature shared by options 5(i) and 5(ii), does not bring forward compliance any earlier when compared to option 8, primarily as the city centre zone is relatively compact and therefore its effects are modest in terms of stimulating compliance.

Option 8 carries less risk in this regard, can be delivered at a lower cost (to Government), and is thus more affordable.

As the option that delivers compliance in the shortest possible time, and at the lowest cost, option 8 is also considered the ‘benchmark CAZ’ for the purposes of comparison.

Whilst option 8 presents many delivery challenges, it is more feasible and achievable than options 5(i) and 5(ii) and thus offers greater confidence that compliance can be achieved in the shortest possible time.
11.11 Further, it is considered that options 5(i) and 5(ii) may cause unacceptable and significant unintended consequences to distributional impacts, particularly in terms of the impact on the affordability for residents, the impact on the local economy, and the impact on health and the quality of life of local residents. There are particular concerns in terms of the potential impacts on low income car-dependent workers, small businesses, and city centre retail. Option 8 delivers compliance in the same year without the same potential risk of damaging economic impacts.

11.12 On balance, therefore, it is considered that option 8, whilst remaining a substantial and complex undertaking, is the surest way of delivering compliance in the shortest possible time; providing considerable health benefits at the lowest cost to society and the economy of the three options.

11.13 Option 8 delivers considerable health benefits between 2021 and 2023, as the chart below indicates.

- Significant reductions in NO₂ concentrations in early years bring real health benefits
- Compliance achieved 3 years earlier than Do Minimum

![Predicted NO₂ Exceedances in GM](chart.png)

11.14 Option 8 is recommended as the option that delivers compliance in the shortest possible time, at the lowest cost, least risk and with the least negative impacts.

11.15 However, concerns remain about the socio-economic impacts, therefore more work is required for the Full Business Case to ensure that proposed mitigations are effective.
11.16 An indicative Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA) has also been completed and will form part of the OBC. However it is noted that further and fuller assessment of economic and equalities impacts will be required at FBC stage.

11.17 There remains much we do not know about the possible impacts of the proposals, for example on low income workers, key business sectors such as retail and leisure, transport and distribution and on small local businesses. A programme of research, analysis, public and stakeholder engagement and a thorough integrated impact assessment has commenced and will be continued throughout 2019.

12. MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES

12.1 The analysis underpinning the GM Clean Air Plan has been produced in line with JAQU guidance using the best data and tools available, and localised to Greater Manchester where possible.

12.2 However, the nature of the air quality challenge means that there are many sources of uncertainty in the modelling, and further sensitivity testing is underway.

12.3 In addition, it is important to acknowledge that there are some key assumptions that will need testing at the Full Business Case stage. This will include bus/taxi/PHV compliance, the behavioural responses of drivers, and the impact of measures such as vehicle renewal funds.

12.4 Assumptions made in the context of advice from JAQU includes that by 2021 that the majority of vehicles in scope will be compliant or upgrade to a compliant vehicle (for example buses and taxis) and the remaining non-compliant:

- HGV’s are assumed to stay and pay, upgrade or cancel their trip;
- PHV’s are assumed to stay and pay or upgrade;
- LGVs are assumed to stay and pay, change mode or cancel their trip.

12.5 The regional scale of the options also means that assumptions should continue to be tested.

12.6 Engagement to date, for example with bus operators, the local taxi and private hire trade and the freight industry has been invaluable in helping develop the measures, and further engagement at local level will be undertaken as part of the process to develop a Full Business Case.
13. **COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT ASSUMPTIONS**

**Commercial assumptions**

13.1 The procurement of all goods and services will use TfGM’s established procurement processes.

**Financial assumptions**

13.2 In developing the OBC, it has been assumed that JAQU Implementation and Clean Air Funds will provide funding for all costs relating to scheme’s implementation, and that DEFRA/JAQU will underwrite any net operational deficit, as may be necessary, over the life of the scheme until compliance is achieved.

13.3 If scheme operations generate any net surplus, this would be re-invested back into achieving Local Transport Plan (2040 Greater Manchester Transport Strategy) objectives, as required by the Transport Act 2000.

13.4 There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in the assumptions around revenue generation, since there is no CAZ currently in operation in the UK. Therefore, the forecasts included in the financial model are indicative at this stage.

13.5 Greater Manchester will be submitting the OBC as an application to the Implementation Fund on the assumption that all the measures outlined in the case are required to bring forward compliance in the shortest possible time frame.

13.6 In the financial business case, it is assumed that:

- the CAZ penalties are a daily charge and set at different levels for different vehicle types, to reflect their emissions. The aim is that non-compliant vehicles with the highest emissions are incentivised to respond to comply with the standard.

- the CAZ daily charges remain constant in nominal prices, and therefore they reduce in real terms.

- any GM CAZ will operate on a daily basis and, therefore, non-compliant vehicles that enter or move within the area of the CAZ will only pay once each day.

13.7 **Table 2 – CAZ Penalties as assumed for modelling purposes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Type</th>
<th>CAZ Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxi / PHV</td>
<td>£7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGV</td>
<td>£7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGV</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus/Coach</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Management Assumptions

13.8 TfGM will continue to co-ordinate delivery from OBC to FBC. Decisions with regard to which organisation will operate any CAZ will be developed between OBC and FBC.

14. CLEAN VEHICLE FUNDS

14.1 An essential component of the OBC is a package of support for businesses affected by the best performing option. This comprises a number of schemes that will be further refined through ongoing engagement with businesses and stakeholders and inform the FBC. Current proposals include the following:

**Clean Freight Fund - covering LGVs, Minibuses, HGVs, Coaches (£59 million)**

14.2 Support for local small businesses, sole traders and the voluntary sector, registered in GM in the form of a discount on the purchase of a compliant commercial vehicle when scrapping a non-compliant vehicle or retrofitting to make compliant.

14.3 Priority for funding will be based primarily on air quality impact such that the most polluting vehicles can be targeted.

**Clean Taxi Fund – covering Taxis and Private Hire Vehicles (£28 million)**

14.4 Support to upgrade non-compliant taxi and private hire vehicles by offering a contribution towards the purchase of a compliant vehicle from an approved supplier when trading in a non-compliant vehicle.

14.5 It will also provide part funding for the retrofitting of taxis.

14.6 This funding opportunity also recognises the work currently being undertaken to develop some common minimum licensing standards for Taxis and Private Hire across Greater Manchester. This work will ensure that there is clarity for the trade and drivers about vehicle standards that meet both proposed CAZ requirements and any Greater Manchester minimum standards, that will be consulted on later in the year.

**Clean Bus Fund (£29 million)**

14.7 Provide support to retrofit the majority of existing Euro IV and V buses with flexibility for the move to an EV bus network, via financial assistance towards charging infrastructure, prioritised on Air Quality benefits and commercial contribution.

14.8 Across all the Clean Vehicle Funds, further work is required between OBC and FBC to develop the assumption on the value per vehicle, criteria for access to the funding by vehicle owners, and the impact on specific groups of businesses affected by the introduction of the CAZ.
Through the 2040 Transport Strategy and the 2014 Devolution Agreement, the Combined Authority is progressing its reform programme utilising the provisions within the Bus Services Act, and as with other modes care is being taken to ensure complementarity in policy development.

**Loan Finance (£TBC)**

Work is also underway to explore the possibility of defining and providing a supporting measure to provide loans at preferential rates for those who are taking advantage of the Clean Vehicle Funding. The exact design and criteria would have to be determined at FBC stage following further engagement and consultation.

So far there have been three key groups for engagement – taxis & PHVs, bus operators and freight/ local business – to understand their concerns, obtain information about their fleets and seek their early feedback on proposals.

The taxi and PHV trade highlighted that subsidies and low interest rate loans would be beneficial as would other incentives through licensing and traffic flow. EV charging infrastructure was key to take up of electric vehicles, but they noted a limited choice for electric taxis, and that timescales for implementation were tight.

Business groups and freight representative bodies provided information about their fleets, to inform the development of the Clean Vehicle Fund measure. They have also advised that certainty around compliant vehicles and timescales for implementing the plan are essential to business planning.

Bus operators raised concerns around the capacity to retrofit vehicles and timescales for implementation.

Stakeholder dialogue will continue throughout development of the GM CAP to support the detailed design of the packages of measures.

**CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER GM POLICIES, PLANS AND STRATEGIES**

Greater Manchester has a longstanding track record in taking a balanced approach to policy development to promote sustainability, inclusion and growth.

The GM approach is unique insofar as it utilises existing governance and administrative arrangements to bring together ten local authorities and their highway networks, permitting the development and the implementation of a co-ordinated plan to reduce roadside NO\textsubscript{2} concentrations that will benefit nearly three million people. Such a joined-up approach provides the potential for the most effective and swift reduction in emissions in areas across the whole of the city region.

Improving air quality is a key policy priority for Greater Manchester. The Greater Manchester Strategy\textsuperscript{12} states that Greater Manchester should be ‘a place at the

\textsuperscript{12} https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/ourpeopleourplace 2017
forefront of action on climate change with clean air and a flourishing natural environment’ including by ‘reducing congestion and improving air quality’.

15.4 Air Quality is also a key focus of the Greater Manchester Transport Strategy 2040 (“2040 Strategy”), which is Greater Manchester’s current statutory Local Transport Plan, prepared by TfGM on behalf of the GMCA and the Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership (GMLEP).

15.5 The 2040 Strategy is accompanied by 5-year delivery plans, which set out the city-region’s short term delivery priorities. A draft updated 5-year Delivery Plan for 2020 to 2025\(^\text{13}\) was published in January 2019, and includes a range of recommendations for delivering Greater Manchester’s clean air and carbon reduction ambitions, building on from the Air Quality Action Plan 2016-2021 and Low Emission Strategy (GMCA, 2016). These include investment in the Greater Manchester Electric Vehicle (EV) charging network; ambitions to deliver a zero-emission bus fleet by 2040; transformation of cycling and walking infrastructure (including £160m investment in the next few years); and measures to reduce freight emissions.

15.6 In common with longstanding policy, further work continues on improving the public transport network and in particular its closer integration across modes. Greater Manchester has consistently used its available transport funding to improve public transport and enhance active travel options, thereby encouraging people to leave their car at home or at park and rides and travel more sustainably. Greater Manchester works to maximise all opportunities to access funding for the region to make it easier to travel by public transport, bike or on foot.

15.7 This Plan will ensure that Greater Manchester can address the nearer term issue of NO\(_2\) exceedances in existing urban areas. Members will recognise that this is a crucial component in safeguarding our urban areas as the strategic focus for future development, as set out in the revised draft Greater Manchester Spatial Framework. Without this continued focus, Greater Manchester would risk excessive dispersed development that would undermine both the existing air pollution challenge and longer-term carbon reduction objectives.

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\(^{13}\) Greater Manchester Transport Strategy 2040 Draft Delivery Plan (2020-2025) (2019), TfGM
16. **NEXT STEPS**

16.1 Subject to the governance approval of each of the ten GM local authorities, the OBC will be submitted to Government within the required deadline of 31 March 2019. Government’s response is expected 6 – 8 weeks after submission.

16.2 A public ‘conversation’ is proposed to run between early May and mid-June (for six weeks) to help further inform the work, and this will supplement the more targeted stakeholder engagement that is ongoing with affected businesses. In addition, further deliberative research is proposed to take place during March and April. These forms of engagement and dialogue will all inform the further development and detailed design of the measures identified in the OBC, to refine the proposals that will comprise the Full Business Case.

16.3 As required by Transport Act 2000, a statutory consultation relating to the proposed introduction of a charging Clean Air Zone is proposed to run between August and October 2019.

16.4 Further work to refine the assumptions and look in detail at 2023 exceedances, including further socio-economic work will be undertaken.

16.5 This will enable the development of a Full Business Case for further consideration by GMCA and constituent local authorities prior to submission to Government by the end of 2019.

17. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

17.1 Local Authority Members considering the OBC report will be asked to:

- Adopt the feasibility study undertaken to date;
- Approve the OBC (for submission to the government's Joint Air Quality Unit);
- Note that further stakeholder engagement and public consultation is an essential part of the process to help inform and refine ongoing work to produce a Full Business Case by the end of the calendar year;
- Approve the commencement of the public conversation and engagement activity from 15 May 2019;
- Note that further reports will be submitted to [Executive/Cabinet] on:
  - the proposals for statutory consultation, informed by the outcome of the public conversation and engagement.
  - formal approval of the Full Business Case.
• Agree that TfGM continue with the activity to produce the Full Business Case on their behalf under the direction of the Greater Manchester Clean Air Steering Group; and

• Delegate to [insert nominated officer/member] the approval of submission of supplementary information.

17.2 Recommendations for GMCA are set out at the front of this report.

Councillor Alex Ganotis

Greater Manchester Green City Lead
### Annex 1 – More detailed assessment of options by compliance date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Compliant sites</th>
<th>Non-compliant sites</th>
<th>Total non-compliant (&gt; 40µg/m³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very compliant</td>
<td>Compliant but close</td>
<td>Non-compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(below 35 µg/m³)</td>
<td>(35 to 40µg/m³)</td>
<td>(40 to 45µg/m³)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do minimum</td>
<td>16,281</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 4</td>
<td>16,820</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 5(i)</td>
<td>16,879</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 5(ii)</td>
<td>16,892</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 7</td>
<td>16,830</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 8</td>
<td>16,836</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do minimum</td>
<td>16,856</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 4</td>
<td>17,056</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 5(i)</td>
<td>17,081</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 5(ii)</td>
<td>17,087</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 7</td>
<td>17,037</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 8</td>
<td>17,072</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do minimum</td>
<td>17,068</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Something 8</td>
<td>Options 5(i), 5(ii) and 8 are fully compliant by 2024, Option 4 by 2025 and Option 7 by 2026.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 2 – Assessment of options by success criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success Factor</th>
<th>Option 5(i)</th>
<th>Option 5(ii)</th>
<th>Option 8</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance in the shortest possible time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All Options deliver compliance in 2024, considered to be the shortest possible time for achieving compliance in GM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in NO₂ emissions</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options deliver significant reductions in the number of locations in exceedance of 70-80% in 2021, with Option 5(ii) predicted to marginally deliver the greatest reductions in each year prior to compliance being achieved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The greatest reduction in NO₂ concentrations at the roadside in each year</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options deliver reductions in mass emissions across GM of between 20-30% in 2021, with the greatest reductions forecast to be delivered by Option 5(ii).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance without putting other sites closer to exceedance</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options are forecast to deliver compliance without putting other sites closer to exceedance, risk that Option 5(ii) leads to more re-routing than forecast.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>The measures proposed in all Options are within the legal powers of the authorities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can a governance route be developed to enable timely local government joint working as required for delivery?</td>
<td></td>
<td>GM has proposed a governance route that facilitates the local government co-operation required for delivery. The complex vehicle change requirements nature of Option 5(ii) is likely to make approvals more difficult.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the likelihood of the measures being effective?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clean Air Zones are presumed to be effective, but there is considerable uncertainty about how drivers will respond within the local context and to a scheme on a region-wide scale. Option 5(ii) is more complex and thus more uncertain.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is delivery of the option subject to significant risks that make achieving compliance in the shortest possible time less likely?</td>
<td></td>
<td>If the full CAP cannot be delivered or funded, compliance may be delayed e.g. if there is not sufficient time or funds to achieve a clean hackney cab or bus fleet. The Plan is subject to risks in terms of the need for multiple approvals from different bodies; the political sensitivity of the proposals; and the need to run activities in parallel. Option 8 involves one rather than two CAZ schemes so is subject to less risk.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic fit with local strategies and plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options deliver improvements in NO₂ concentrations, and also reduce PM and greenhouse gas emissions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options act to promote sustainable travel and will deliver a cleaner, newer bus and taxi fleet for GM passengers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk that the city centre CAZ schemes deter housing and employment development; which could impact on the delivery of the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework. Option 8 delivers clean air without this risk.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk that the city centre CAZ schemes affect economic performance. Option 8 delivers clean air without this risk. In all Options, CAZs will impose costs on local businesses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value for money</td>
<td></td>
<td>It would be more cost effective to deliver the changes more slowly, however this is a public health emergency so action is vital. Option 8 delivers compliance at the lowest imposed cost.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributional impact</td>
<td></td>
<td>All groups will experience health benefits. Those living in areas with the worst air quality and those most vulnerable to the effects of poor air quality will benefit the most.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td>The scheme brings improved accessibility in terms of small reductions in journey times for road traffic. Option 8 does not impose costs on private vehicles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility (in terms of journey time and connectivity to opportunities and services)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Options 5(ii) impose costs affecting low income car drivers, with more vehicles in scope for charges in Option 5(ii). Option 8 delivers clean air without this risk but still imposes costs on small businesses and sole traders.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordability (for users)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Options 5(ii) may affect the quality of life of low income car drivers. Option 8 delivers clean air without this risk. Low income professional drivers may be affected by all Options.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on the local economy – considering low income workers, small businesses, town centres and key sectors</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Options impose costs on small businesses and low income professional drivers; proposals to support fleet upgrade mitigate this somewhat. Options 5(ii) risk impacts on the city centre economy avoided in Option 8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on the quality of life of local residents and on equalities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Options 5(ii) may affect the quality of life of low income car drivers. Option 8 delivers clean air without this risk. Low income professional drivers may be affected by all Options.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliverability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Option 8 is the lowest cost option and is thus the most affordable for the public sector.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Affordability of the cost of implementation (for the public sector)</td>
<td></td>
<td>There are concerns about supply side capacity e.g. the availability of specialist compliant vehicles such as hackney cabs, and retrofitting capacity and risks of delays.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The supply of local capacity and capability to deliver the measures outlined in the option</td>
<td></td>
<td>The scale of the region-wide CAZ, supporting programmes and associated cost, and the need for cross-district collaboration, creates delivery risk. This risk is even greater for a city centre CAZ D scheme.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Achievability of delivering the option considering issues such as difficulty with scale or obtaining resources to implement and operate a measure/option</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>