Agenda item

HIGH RISE TASK FORCE

Report of Paul Dennett, Portfolio Leader for Housing, Homelessness and Infrastructure.

Minutes:

City Mayor Paul Dennett, Portfolio Leader for Housing, Homelessness and Infrastructure, introduced a report, which outlined the progress of the Greater Manchester High Rise Task Force (GMHRTF), and the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service High Rise Team (GMFRSHRT), in regard to high rise residential buildings in Greater Manchester (GM), and its contribution nationally in this area.

 

Also in attendance was Jim Wallace, Chief Fire Officer, Tony Hunter, Director of Protection and SPPCI, Jenni Seex, Head of Protection, and Robin Lawler, Chief Executive of Northwards Housing, and Chair of the GM Fire Safety Technical Group.

 

The following key points were highlighted:

 

·         The GMHRTF had been set up following the Mayoral Summit on the 25 June 2017, with the purpose of overseeing the GM response to the fire at Grenfell Tower.

·         The ultimate priority for the GMHRTF, was to provide reassurance on GM fire safety, and to ensure buildings were safe, and that GM could respond effectively to a major high rise incident.

·         A survey of residents living in high rise buildings was undertaken over the summer, and utilised as part of the GMHRTF response, to the Governments consultation on ‘Building a Safer Future’. The survey was subsequently extended until the start of September 2019 and a final report was being prepared.

·         Following the publication of the Hackitt Report, MHCLG working with NFCC and Local Authority Building Control (LABC) had created a series of working groups to consider what work was necessary to develop and deliver a Joint Competent Authority (JCA) arrangement.

·         The significantly positive work undertaken by the GMHRTF and the GMFRS High Rise Team in GM, and on the national stage, had been recognised nationally, with GMFRS invited to be a member of the new Protection Board.

·         The Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 report has been published, and included a number of recommendations, which were carefully being considered by the GMHRTF, GMFRS, and partners.

·         The GMHRTF currently meet every six weeks, and is attended by GMFRS, representatives of local authorities, housing providers, universities, utility companies, and representatives of managing agents for privately owned blocks of flats.

·         The GMHRTF had developed a number of task groups/cells to carry out focused work, and the majority of these were led by GMFRS.

·         The current number of blocks where interim measures are required was currently 79. The definition of high rise, was currently buildings which were more than 18 metres in height.

·         A major element of the work to ensure operational readiness, was the development of guidance, for the role of operational crews in supporting and ensuring the evacuation of residents at an incident, in buildings, where an evacuation strategy has been implemented. The fire incident at the Cube, in Bolton, on Friday, had tested this response.

·         The Operational Assurance team had implemented smoke curtains on all appliances, supported by operational guidance, to support the effective escape of residents, in the event of a fire.

·         The main concern was the number of buildings, which still had unsafe cladding on the outside of them, and the associated costs (some in the range of £40,000), which had fallen upon many residents to make their homes safe, as the developers, building owners, and free holders were refusing to take responsibility. This issue continues to be raised with Government on behalf of residents.

 

Members raised the following questions and comments:

 

·         A Member from Salford, highlighted the challenges they had faced in identifying an appropriate solution to the cladding issues, and the difficulties in accessing funding to remediate buildings owned by Private Finance Investments (PFI). How were the GMHRTF supporting localities to implement cladding solutions, which were future proofed?

 

The City Mayor advised that the Government had produced advice note 14, which clearly articulated what solutions were permissible. The Committee were informed that in December 2018, the Government, made an amendment to Building Regulations, to prohibit the use of ‘combustible cladding’ on buildings over 18 metres, making it simpler to work through the technical solutions available. The complexities in identifying the right cladding for individual buildings were noted, given that a number of factors were at play, which included, weight and wind load. 

 

·         A Member asked whether the same requirements to remove and replace cladding applied to buildings, which had cladding on one wall, or on the top floor.

 

Jenni Seex, advised that there were complexities to consider, but all buildings with category 2/3 Aluminum Composite Material (ACM) on, should be remediated. Cladding which was on the top floors did however, present as lower risk, as the highest risk was regards to a fire spreading horizontally. It was confirmed that elements such as the type and position of cladding, contributed to whether interim measures were adopted in terms of building the evacuation strategy. Robin Lawler, added that housing providers were dealing with buildings on a portfolio basis, with category 2/3 ACM affected, being remediated on a risk based approach. It was noted that Private Finance Initiative (PFI) owned buildings were particularly complex, as Government did not class them as public or private, so funding could not be accessed.

 

·         Had GMHRTF submitted recommendations to Government, which could feed into future regulations? Clarification was requested in relation to whether the aim was to move away from the use of cladding entirely.

 

It was confirmed that MHCLG attended regular meetings with the HRTF, so were fully sighted on the frustrations and challenges, such as, the requirement to pay VAT, on the removal and replacement of cladding.

 

The City Mayor confirmed that GM were also lobbying for an emergency fund which went beyond ACM, and felt that it was clear from the phase 1 report, and the Government’s Independent Review of Building Regulations, and Fire Safety, that the current regulatory system was not fit for purpose.

 

It was envisaged that the publication of the Phase 2 report, could prompt Government to implement the fundamental changes required to building regulations, which were required. 

 

Tony Hunter, noted that the tragic incident, at the Cube in Bolton on Friday, involved cladding with high-pressure laminate (HPL), which only emphasised the need for a complete system overhaul. A risk stratified approach to building safety was needed, that was person centric, and prioritised vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, and students. 

 

The Committee were informed that the National Fire Chief’s Council (NFCC) had recommended to Government that sprinklers become a requirement in all high rise residential structures above 30 metres in height.

 

Members were advised that following the amendment to building regulations in December 2018, there were now tighter controls in place, regarding the types of products which can be used. It was noted that glazing systems were currently popular, noting that all buildings over 30 metres were required to have sprinklers, notwithstanding, GMHRTF was lobbying for a lower height threshold.

·         The City Mayor referred to the austerity faced by GMFRS, and the requirement to reduce their budget by £12.8m over the next three years. Post Grenfell, Government must acknowledge that further cuts were not acceptable, as resources are needed to focus on protecting public safety.

 

·         Clarity was sought in relation to the number of buildings in special measures. It was confirmed that 80 buildings over 18 metres were in special measures currently, albeit, buildings below 18 metres were potentially affected. The Northern Quarter was highlighted, as an example of where there were a number of multi floor buildings in close proximity, and explored what level of risk these posed.

 

The complexities were discussed, noting that the aim was to manage those risks by implementing effective evacuation strategies, such as implementing a ‘waking watch’ or improving the quality of fire alarms, which were installed. Members were informed that an awareness event was held in October 2019, attended by 53 people from across the 1200 blocks in GM. Universities had also been engaged to review their fire safety arrangements.

 

·         A Member referred to media reports regarding the use of cladding in other parts of the buildings, such as internal insulation fillers. Had these wider issues been addressed?

 

The HRTF were engaging with developers, and consistently reiterating that the focus on ACM was too narrow. Following the initial inspections, it was quickly identified that the issues were complex, and a dedicated team was needed, in order to identify and assess the risks posed, on an ongoing basis. There was an increasing need for blocks to change their evacuations strategy as more information was becoming available. It was noted that converted buildings (from commercial to residential), were being asked to have compartmentation surveys conducted.

 

The Committee were informed that four buildings had been deemed prohibited, noting the challenges this posed, and impact on peoples lives. A block in Salford, which was affected by internal compartmentation, was quoted costs of more than half its value to correct the issue. 

 

Robin Lawler, added that in the social housing sector, level 3 & 4 risk assessments had been commissioned to check compartmentation. The outcomes of these assessments were generally shared with GMFRS, so that remediation factors could be agreed. It was acknowledged that the costs had impacted on a providers ability to address legacy issues, and make further investments.

 

·         A Member referred to GMFRS’s decision to change their policy on Automatic Fire Alarms (AFA’s) and explored whether this was still deemed appropriate.

 

Tony Hunter, reported that they were six months into a 12 month pilot. Within quarter 1, 2000 AFA’s had been received, noting that eight incidents attended, requiring only the use of a fan, to blow the smoke out of the buildings.  It was noted that crews had taken these opportunities to familiarise themselves with the buildings, and update their records. Members were informed that AFA’s were not factored into how GMFRS determine resource requirements. 

 

·         Were residents able to access the assessments conducted by property owners/landlords?

The GMHRTF had recommended that this information should be made accessible, and summaries should be produced. The potential impacts on GMFRS in terms of Freedom of Information (FOI’s) were noted.

 

·         A Member explored whether newly approved developments were using materials which were future proofed, and would not be affected by future regulations (i.e. deemed unsafe at a later date).

 

Full assurance could not be given at this stage, however, the Building Research Establishment, were testing cladding systems, and making those outcomes public; to support the Government to provide clarification as to what was permissible.

 

The City Mayor emphasised the importance that clarification was received, if GM was to meet the local housing needs over the next 20 years, which was to provide 201,000 homes. Localities also had to demonstrate a 5 year land supply, so that valuable green space was protected. GM was continuing to engage with Government within the timescales set.

 

Members were informed that following the Hackett Review, an Industry Safety Steering Group had been developed, which included 12 working groups, tasked with looking at the competences requirements of different trade associations. In addition, insurers were taking a much more rigid approach, with a number of inspectors unable to renew their insurance, due to the tighter scrutiny, driven by the risks of litigation. This was the biggest driver in terms of improving standards, and ensuring that builds were developed properly.

 

RESOLVED:

 

1.      That the update be noted and the comments of this Committee be taken into account in developing ongoing work.

 

2.      That a further update be arranged in the next municipal year as appropriate.

 

 

Supporting documents: